Exhibit A-11

EXHIBIT
72
HO-14036

deeproot Family of Companies

Investment Portfolio Narrative 2020.B2

deeproot Capital Management is a holding entity for a family of companies that looks to seize on opportunities outside the traditional investment options, to offer fixed terms and fixed rates while continuing to add to the strength and diversification of the portfolio. We provide our retail investors an above-market return with non-correlated market risk profile. We then invest a portion in investment grade life policies, and the rest in to multiple innovative ventures. Those ventures have the potential to yield multiples in return from the moderate to nominal investment made over the last few years. We have invested in other ventures and assets that attempt to continue and remain consistent with a non-correlated, safety-focused profile.

We recently received the following questions, which we intend to answer in this narrative:

- What percent of the fund is Pinball?
- Snapshot of the fund and assets with real numbers
- Is Pinball owned by the fund or is it a secured note?
- Why did Robert choose to go into Pinball specifically rather than other things such as real estate?
- What are the expectations for the fund moving forward and after Pinball?
- What is the contingency plan/what is the impact it will have on investors if Pinball does not succeed?
- What is the allocation and business strategy behind each of the allocations in the fund?
- Do we have enough assets in policies to cover what we owe to investors?
- How is Pinball a true cashflow play vs doing something like real estate that has proven history of being great for cashflow
- Where is the data/market research that gives you confidence that pinball is viable and can be a successful industry to go into? (many think pinball is dying and the industry is going towards VR and other types of gaming)
- Are policies even a part of our strategy anymore? It seems more like a pinball company than an investment company

EXHIBIT
25
02-16-2023

SEC-DEEPROOT-E-0013223

PART I
Investment Portfolio and Analysis

OVERVIEW

The recording of accounting transactions is typically done annually, however it is not finalized by our accounting firm until the summer after. Therefore we are presenting an accounting of transactions as of Q2 2019 for an appropriate time period for this narrative. Lastly, this overview specifically targets the allocations of the deeproot 575 Fund, LLC ('the575').

Assuming $29.6MM allocated to the575 Fund by June 30, 2019, the following graph and figures constitute the investment as of that time.

- Policies: ~ 53.54% or $15.85MM in Face Value
- deeproot Tech, Pinball, Studios: ~ 37.66% or $11.147MM
- Car Wash/RE: ~ 7.61% or $2.25MM
- deeproot Sports & Entertainment: ~ 0.9% or $287,000
- Agriculture and Mining Interests: ~ 0.4% or $125,000



LIFE POLCIES

Strategy: Life policies are a non-correlated asset class because of its link to a life-in-being rather than to political, economic, stock or interest rate markets. The insurance backed safety makes it lower risk than most securities, while still providing inevitable predictability of payout. Our philosophy here is to invest in high-return to low-premium ratio life policies with favorable underwriting statistics.

Benefits: Non-correlation, purchasing turn-key, high predictable return, underwriting mitigation.

Pitfalls: Underwriting can be unpredictable, and potentially substantial to fixed terms and liquidity, without mitigation of policies with other forms of leverage & liquidity.

Mitigation: Mitigation of underwriting risks is key to purchasing and maintain policy portfolios. To mitigate underwriting risk we underwrite to a LE+1 or LE+2 standard and choose lower face-to-premium ratios before purchasing policies. Since actual maturity is unknown, we have a diversified portfolio of other more predictable assets to wait out unknown maturity times. Finally, whereas most companies have failed, or will fail due to over-leveraging to overcome pitfalls, deeproot decided to diversify with other asset classes.

TECH

Strategy: An enterprise with engineers and scientists that develop, research, and bring to market, tangible technology, and intangible IP. The first project is pinball because of its formational structure complements setting up a solid engineering pipeline. But there are other tech R&D in the works that involve virtual reality, automotive, weather management, and logistics.

Benefits: Tech development can provide tangible and intangible assets strength and market penetration. It provides balance sheet cushion for other investment projects, as well as solid revenue potential. Accounting treatment can minimize and offset R&D costs.

Pitfalls: It is difficult to gauge marketability of innovations prior to launch. R&D can result in a waste of resources and time. Losses, if they occur can be difficult to recoup without attaching to other projects

Mitigation: Brand recognition of a multi-industry company like deeproot can help soften risks of initial launches. We have a highly talent engineering team from multiple industrial areas. We have spent years building a robust pipeline which minimizes waste through the stepgate process. We tackle projects that blend into a portfolio and ones we can overcome risks with competency.

PINBALL

Strategy: We originally started the pinball project to diversify against our life policies to add internal cashflows. However, once it became apparent of the sizable scope of the project two beneficial outcomes presented substantial upside potential. First, since pinball can be as complex as say building an vehicle, it would force us to set up the engineering and software pipelines, AV resources, and marketing/sales channels that could be used for other tech projects. Second, deeproot's Principal, Robert Mueller, who has a vast knowledge and expertise in pinball and the weaknesses in the dysfunctional pinball industry, saw an opportunity to exploit those weaknesses with a high probability of success. Seeing an opportunity to disrupt the pinball market in offering a vastly better experience for minimal additional cost to the end user has allowed us to create a near-perfect platform for other ventures.

Benefits: Pinball is and has been back "in" as vintage Americana. It has a high visibility in the press. It forces setup of diverse multi-industry pipelines. Strong net profit margin and sales potential. Acquisition of high profile pinball talent.

Pitfalls: Normal startup risks that require much of the project to be R&D'ed prior to revenue. Much of the project is trial and error as there are few standards. Costs can be greater than normal (at first) by bringing much of the pre-processing and heavy manufacturing in house.

Mitigation: Risks of a new startup with complex engineering, multiple diverse industry-centric know-how, and substantial capital outlays prior to revenue are difficult to overcome. Robert's expertise and key hires have mitigated the industry knowledge. Strong

engineering documentation and process policies have helped mitigate engineering complexity. Cost risk has been mitigated in three ways: (i) other investments; (ii) minimizing waste and pulling back on launch deliverables that are too costly; and (iii) not focusing on too many capital intensive projects at once.

ART & ANIMATION

Strategy: The Studios were created as a division after trying and failing to find an animation studio to do our pinball animations to the quality level we needed and within reasonable costs. Since the movies, TV, and games suck up most of the animation studio capital, it made the most sense to look for a market with lots of talent that could (in time) create a self-sustaining studio. Being born mid-2018, the Studios are based in Salt Lake City and have developed four pipelines. They currently handle all our Pinball animation, but also develop other original IP, as well as contract work in the following areas: VFX, Film, TV Development, Video Games, VR, Card / Board Game Development, Toy development, and AR.

Benefits: Highly visible in industry, region, and press. Strong future earning potential with increasing rates and recession-proof demand for services. No shortage of talent in regional area. Intangible assets could potentially be worth more in time than contract work.

Pitfalls: Normal startup risks. Long pipeline development times. Labor costs are very high in Utah. Infrastructure costs and dependence of high-end technology are above average.

Mitigation: We are mitigating our risks in three ways. First we developed a strong business development team to take in contract work to reach self sustainability faster. Secondly, we have hired top talent from Disney, Warner Bros, Universal, Pixar, Weta, Lucasfilm and more with experience working on several well-known projects and movies. And lastly, we are using advanced pipeline engineering tools to lower development time and costs.

REAL ESTATE

Strategy: We have invested in real estate in two ways. First in 2017 & 2018, we provide debt funding by note for the construction of a carwash. This investment would provide a balloon payout with a pre-set rate of return in a roughly 5 year time frame. Second, we have sought to invest in real estate around our Texas headquarters. It is a valuable high-demand area with strong rental rates, excellent infrastructure, and the only large industrial park on this side of San Antonio.

Benefits: Carwash had experienced (and existing car wash owners) develop and build-out. For other RE: Prime locations. Likelihood of strong stream of income.

Pitfalls: Real estate investments are very susceptible to economic fluctuations; very costly to set up diversified portfolio; and risky to maintain cash flows. There are also additional legal and maintenance costs that need to be mitigated.

Mitigation: In terms of the car wash, we have structured a deal to benefit from the long-term buyout or refinance structure at a buyout of principal plus return. For other real estate, we have strong relationships with owners of surrounding properties and discussed terms on several of them that would be well below market acquisitions.

AGRICULTRE AND MINING

Strategy: We invested a minority equity interest in a company that consults and manages agricultural and mining projects in northern Africa. To date, almost $800MM in government and NGO contracts are either signed or under negotiation.

Benefits: If the contracts are fully signed and reasonably implemented, would lead to highly profitable streams of income.

Pitfalls: Any investment outside of the domestic US is risky, especially in Africa. Substantial geo-political turmoil and corruption. There is a very high risk of loss of our investment capital.

Mitigation: In terms of our entire investment portfolio, we have limited this investment to 0.4%, and have no further expectation of additional investment. We are in constant contact with management with updates and assist in legal & financial ways.

SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT

Strategy: After sponsoring a local minor league soccer team in 2014 – 2015, we hired the general manager to start developing projects in the sports and entertainment industries. We are currently working with many different cities across the US to be able to either franchise a team or teams in the area and profit from management rights or flip the rights of a multi-use complex to a developer with first rights of refusal. We are limiting the sports to minor league baseball, soccer, and hockey.

Benefits: The head of this division is well known and regarded with ample connections and expertise in the industries. This venture has taken minimal capital to this point and if we decide to flip the rights it will take little to no additional capital to generate large profits. With the operation of a franchise, we will profit from management rights on the stadiums, teams and concessions. High profile and press of multiple sport, multiple venue/team ownership.

Pitfalls: There is a risk if we are unable to fully fund licensing or franchise costs prior to startup. Most sports teams (at all levels) are not consistently profitable.

Mitigation: We have a key player in the industry negotiating on our behalf and working with the different cities, developers and organizations to construct a deal that makes sense for us before moving forward and providing additional capital. We always have the ability to walk away from a deal. Lastly, we have several existing owners willing to sell franchise or rights for less than startup demands.

PART II
Pinball Narrative

Many of the questions prompting this narrative revolve around 'Why Pinball?' and 'What if it fails?'. While we have previously provided a disclosure and have been available for comments regarding these questions for years, we are providing additional narrative – FOR AGENT USE ONLY. Now that pinball is about the launch, many of these questions and answers might be irrelevant for current investors. We are providing this narrative in good faith to inspire confidence in current and future allocations.

LIFE POLICIES ARE STILL OUR PRIMARY ASSET CLASS

Life policies are, and will continue to be, our primary asset class. It is the perfect ***war chest*** asset class. It is non-market correlated, non-interest rate correlated, non-economy corelated, huge return potential, somewhat predictable maintenance costs, and backed by very strong, high rated insurance companies. Those strengths alone make it almost the perfect investment. However, the unknown premium expense and ESPECIALLY the unpredictability of maturity counter weighs those strengths and has to be addressed in a Fund vehicle (ongoing).

WHY FOCUS ON SOMETHING OTHER THAN LIFE POLICIES?

As before, life policies have very strong strengths compared to any other asset class available for institutional purchase in the market. However, while they have few weaknesses, the two (Premiums and Life Expectancy) are very difficult weaknesses to overcome. That is why nearly all companies who have tried to primarily base their investment company strategy on life policies has failed, become insolvent, went in to receivership, filed for bankruptcy, etc.

The downfall of these companies (and strategy) wasn't really because of the life policies themselves. It instead was due to the company's CHOICE of how to deal with the weaknesses. In nearly every case, the company chose to LEVERAGE (i.e. either borrow capital at high rates on the open marketing, or ponzi-scheme proceeds) against the future maturities. Because it takes time for a new portfolio to start maturing and producing revenues, the ***trick*** is having enough *unleveraged* money to outwait the 'wait time'. Failing to do so is (and has been) the death knell. We saw the writing on the wall years ago and decided to do something bold and different.

OPTIONS

When we looked at our options back in 2016, of what to do instead of leveraging with loans, we knew we had a couple of obstacles. We weren't bringing in enough capital to 'play' in the institutional investment sector. And we had limited expertise in many of the options. We knew that if we chose from the ***normal list*** of institutional-grade options (e.g. bonds, equities, ETFs, other Funds, REITs, Real Estate, etc.) we were (and would operate at great risk) at a competitive disadvantage. In our eyes and reasoning... why would an investor invest with us, when they could go out and invest directly in those assets on their own.

Each of the above investment options had their own pros and cons, and risks. Our strategy has always been to focus on non-correlated assets, and all of these were heavily correlated. In addition, most could not provide the reward-to-risk ratio we needed to cover investor and agent costs, as well as be profitable

for us. Taking losses (or even expecting to take losses ongoing) behind the scenes as a normal course of business was not an option. Neither was investing in a very risky capital-intensive option like commercial real estate, where we did not have the capital to adequately fund the large project purchases we needed.

So, with the 'normal list' out, we brainstormed on projects that: weren't correlated, were self-collateralized, had a reasonable startup cost, had great return potential, had fairly mitigatable risk, and were/was something we could manage ourselves without a lot of trial-and-error or ramp-up-learning. Well... with my happenstance introduction to the pinball market in 2015, it seemed most sensible at the time that a Pinball project fit all of these parameters, and made perfect sense to go that direction (for the reasons that follow).

While deeproot Tech, LLC and deeproot Pinball, LLC are affiliates of deeproot Funds, LLC under deeproot Capital Management, LLC, we decided on taking a hybrid approach to the investments. While owned by a parent company, deeproot Tech and deeproot Funds executed an agreement securing 40% of net income to be paid back to deeproot Funds from revenues.

REASONS

There are nine reasons for choosing Pinball. While often written in the present tense below, these were considerations and reasons for moving forward back in 2016.

1. Fit the Parameters – The Pinball project fit our parameters. It wasn't the same tired investments any investor could invest in. It wasn't correlated to interest rates, market volatility, macro-economic fluctuations and pressure. It is partially self-collateralized as an asset-based project with real property, equipment, inventory, tools, computers, fixtures, etc. The startup costs were reasonable for the industry size, and has massive return potential (both value and cash-flow). We could do it ourselves with our expertise and hires we had lined up. And the risks (albeit some that were large at first) we either have mitigated, or are mitigating.

2. High Visibility – There are two ways the Pinball project provides high visibility. First, deeproot Funds is limited by federal and state laws from marketing deeproot and the deeproot brand. While those restrictions apply to financial solicitation, it does not apply to non-financial marketing of other deeproot companies. By creating other entities as businesses, it collaterally expands the visibility of the financial products as well. Second, 'tech'-anything has always been prized by investors, regulators, and institutional market players. Since pinball is tech related, we knew that we would be able to obtain instant universal recognition, even before launch.

3. Disrupt a Small, Dysfunctional Industry – Unlike billion-dollar industries like casino gaming, online gaming, mobile gaming, console gaming, or VR/AR, Pinball is a small industry. Trying to compete with companies with revenues in the low millions is much easier than companies in crowded cut-throat industries who have billions at their disposal to crush us. In addition, the pinball industry has been dysfunctional with players who can't get things right, don't satisfy the consumer, and have no real innovator threatening to disrupt the industry.

4. Pinball was/is Popular – Pinball has experienced a massive, 'it'-factor resurgence over the last ten years. It is everywhere in the media, sales have skyrocketed, and leagues and players are all over. In addition, consumers look to vintage Americana for many of their luxury purchases. Pinball is nostalgic enough to fit into that niche, non-correlated area like most entertainment (i.e. when

disposable income goes down, people keep spending on lifestyle decisions like entertainment). We do not anticipate any foreseeable drop in the growth or popularity of pinball as a home-use luxury purchase, an on-location commercial arcade piece, or popularity as a sport in leagues and tournaments.

5. Future Business Purposes – There is no hiding that Pinball is complex to design and manufacture, as much as a car. There are physical engineering components, as well as the digital creation of assets. It takes a lot of specialized personnel across multiple industries to pull together. While this is a huge negative for a startup company without prior experience, we have already overcome the obstacles with key staff and R&D, and have turned this negative in to a positive. A side-benefit is that all of these divisions have already been staffed, paid-for, processes defined, and bugs worked-out, for the Pinball project. That means that a myriad of other future ventures can be done easier & cheaper by using existing divisions. This can range from video games, AR/VR, or art consulting by the Studios; inventing the next billion-dollar 'widget' with our engineers, or creating custom software or mobile apps with our programmers, etc. The entry cost, startup risks have already been mitigated.

6. Profits vs. Returns – This concept is important and one very critical to our decision. Profits are yours to keep. Returns you have to pay back. Yes, starting a business has all kinds of inherent risks. But if we had chosen an investment from the 'normal list', we would have had the biggest drawback of all... we would eventually have to pay back that capital double fold. Whereas with Pinball, we can use the profits to strengthen deeproot (which strengthens the backing of the investor dollars), safely buy more life policies, as well as provide cash flow to cover investor maturities and payments, and self-fund future ventures with our money (as opposed to investors).

7. Best of All Worlds – Building on #6 *infra* we don't get the best of both worlds in most of those other investments on the 'normal list'. Having an entity that builds its own value, that we have 100% control over, as well as provides cash-flow, is key to a successful pursuit. And! In the case we need to actually obtain a loan or leverage for financial purposes, this affiliate entity accepts the credit-worthiness and takes all the risk as borrower, instead of the sacred deeproot Funds financial division.

8. Takes Pressure off the War Chest – In order to let life policies do what they do best, it is key to take the pressure off the war chest without sacrificing the company with dangerous debt-load. Even though pinball is a year late in launching, it is still launching prior to most of the 'first' money coming due late this year and early 2021 that was invested in the575 Fund. That gives the ability to leave the core war chest to keep building value, but still be able to have the liquid capital to pay back non-renewing maturing on time.

9. Not Enough Capital – We rely on you to bring us investor capital; and we are appreciative of the efforts. As we have mentioned many times from inception: unknown cash flows, unknown receipt of cases, and conservation efforts have all made it difficult for us to budget, project, and rely on capital to be there when we need it. So back in 2016, when we still were trying to build the then-new equity funds, we were very concerned about choosing an endeavor that we wouldn't be able to fund with highly unpredictable cash flows. That takes out buying a lot more policies; and also takes out investing in the 'normal list' above. When we first came up with budgets for the Pinball project, what we liked (more than the estimated total cost of the project) was that the costs were

incremental and manageable. And if (in the contingency that) money did not come in as needed, there were lots of potential options available to reduce scope, reduce staff, delay the project, etc.

MARKET DATA AND CONDITIONS

The global Pinball market is rather small. Since most of the companies who 'made' the pinball market from the 1940's to the end of the 1990's are no longer in pinball, public records of the current market don't exist. So how do we know about market data? We spent five years immersed in the industry and can closely estimate the market size and potential.

While there are no public records, the new-in-box (NIB) pinball market has roughly ranged from 6,000 sales per year to 12,000 sales per year since 2011. We estimate that they have increased every year since 2011. Stern holds about 80-90% of market, with Jersey Jack, Spooky Pinball, Chicago Gaming Company, American Pinball, and a few smaller companies making up the rest of the market (in that order of size). NIB games sell for as little as $5,000 and as high as $15,000 or more. So the estimated 2019 market size for NIB games was roughly between $72MM and $91MM. We anticipate selling within this range as well.

We estimate the following BOM cost/sales prices for the following manufacturers. BOM means build of materials and does not include labor, admin, overhead, legal, taxes, or anything else.

Manufacturer	Avg BOM	Avg Sales Price
Stern	$3,250	$7,000
CGC	$5,000	$8,000
JJP	$6,500	$9,000
Spooky	$4,500	$7,500
AP	$5,250	$7,250

These averages do not take in to account multiple editions (at varying BOM and price points). So there is some skew to these figures as limited edition games sell at a much higher price, and much better than standard editions. So overall, estimated gross margins range from 12.5% for some titles, and up to 64.25% for limited editions. We estimate our margins to be within these ranges as well.

We estimate that following companies can only manufacturer the indicated games per month (i.e. manufacturing capacity), and have approximately the indicated workforce. We plan to start with 100 games per month by our second month, then gradually increase to 500 by the sixth month; and max out with about 80 workers. That is a sizable competitive advantage to Stern who primarily throttles with mostly un-trained temp workers.

Manufacturer	Est. Workers	Games/mo
Stern	325	400-700
CGC	50	100
JJP	35	100
Spooky	15	40
AP	30	50

While Stern heavily relies on distributors, informal distribution networks and direct to consumer sales are the norm for the industry. There are perhaps as few as 20 top distributors in the US that comprise 90% of

distributors sales. International distributors are essential due to complex legal and tax issues for selling outside the US. We estimate that 50-60% of our sales will be direct in the US, and the remainder through approx. 10 distributors domestically, and perhaps the same number for international sales.

Stern typically releases 4-5 titles a year. The rest of the field usually only release one title every 18-24 months. We have 13 titles in the works, and another 10-12 planned. So we plan to release more on Stern's level than the rest, and have enough games in the pipeline to last several years.

With a few exceptions, nearly all of the above pinball manufacturers are in Illinois; a high-cost, highly-regulated, highly-taxed state. We anticipate Texas will provide 10-15% overall competitive advantage with a much lower tax cost, fewer and more favorable regulations, and lower overall overhead and labor cost.

Lastly, deposits are a sticky issue in the industry. There were several companies that have come and gone that collected deposits to start their company, but then went out of business because they didn't have enough capital to get to launch. Those customers with deposits lost their money. So pinball customers are very sensitive about paying deposits on games from a new company. That means (while the companies above use deposits regularly to estimate consumer demand and pay for a new title to get launched), we cannot rely on deposits at all for the initial run of games.

ANTICIPATED PROFITS

There is a lot that goes in to the final profit from a manufacturing company. Cost of Goods Sold ('COGS') handles the cost of raw materials and labor. But you also have to account for overhead, administrative and operational costs, development costs, and then debt, amortization, interest, taxes, etc. We have written up countless budgets and projections over the years. They are just that... projections.

The short of it is the following. We anticipate in the first year (mid 2020 to mid 2021) to sell a least 4000 machines at an average of $7,000 (~$28MM) with a profit margin of 40%, or ~$11.2MM in profit. With that figure... 40% of that profit, or $4.48MM, will go back to deeproot Funds. The remaining $6,720,000 will be split between paying back development costs and ongoing inventory. We estimate the second year profits would be higher by 20%. That would mean in less than two years, the entire project would be over paid for, dF would receive over $10MM in capital it wouldn't have to pay back (to fund reserves, pay interest and maturities).

Even if our actual sales are one-quarter of the estimates above, we will still turn a profit large enough to pay back deeproot Funds a healthy amount that far exceeds anticipated maturities and investor payments.

Pinball has not died in nearly 80 years of its commercial existence. We do not anticipate that it will die prior to the full repayment of the project, even if later than 2022. Even a retraction of the industry would not be too much of an impact on us. The majority of companies are not as well set up as we are to weather lower sales. So we would likely see the loss of several smaller competitors. In addition, Stern is top heavy, so a down-turn in the market would see Stern struggling with lower sales and having to eliminate costs. This provides us ample room to continue with strong sales as the only company ready for a worst case scenario in the industry.

CONTINGENCIES

In order to answer questions along the lines of 'What if something negative happens?' or 'What if it fails?' we have to first review some of the weaknesses or potential risks. Each of these contingencies are usually ones that we can mitigate, rather than are business-ending risks. In reviewing these, we stress that these answers are very different now (just at launch), than they would have been a year or more ago. Most of these (as raised by your questions) were thought about and dealt with long ago.

Prior to Launch

A simple answer to most of the 'Prior to Launch' contingencies below is that they are very unlikely, but manageable given nearly all of our product designs are done, and the first game is ready to be manufactured. Otherwise we can answer each as follows...

- **Not enough capital to finish the project**
  We estimate only about $2MM is left to finish the project by June. This would mostly be spent on labor, equipment, and especially inventory. There are several options available in each of those areas if the capital is not there. We could hold off on permanent line workers by temporarily using temp labor. We could use outside vendors to cover the work (albeit at a higher cost) than finalizing the purchase of the last equipment. And we could deal with inventory in several ways: purchase in lower volumes and give up more profit; obtain outside leverage for inventory; wait for more capital to come in for orders, etc.
- **Loss of Key staff**
  While some staff have come and gone, the core management team for engineering, software, and digital assets have primarily stayed the same. This continuity has helped bridge the gap when we have lost key staff. But even if we do lose a key member, promoting from within, or hiring externally is the best option to prevent project contamination issues.
- **The economy tanks**
  The economy tanking prior to launch typically would affect the capital to finish the project more than the project itself. We don't anticipate sales until June/July so it would give several months for the volatility and psychological aspect to settle. As in the answer above, we have options on how to deal with capital short runs prior to Launch.
- **Staff can't finish product designs**
  The good news is that the product designs are done and shouldn't change prior to launch.
- **Robert dies**
  Well this would suck. But the great news (as discussed in the same contingency below) is that everything will be fine with the company.

Post-Launch

Most of the answers to most of the 'Post-Launch' contingencies below is that (while they are unlikely to tank the entire company), steps can be taken to mitigate or lessen the damage to the company. Many of these are issues that every company has to deal with, when considering business decisions, strategic plans, and budgeting. Otherwise we can answer each as follows...

- **Loss of Key staff**
  Essentially the same answer as above.

- **Higher costs than anticipated**
  Costs are a risk factor for every company. And there are countless way of how to deal with them. In our discussion above about profit, the 40% profit margin already took into consideration higher costs than what is experienced by most of the industry. Buying volume drives (or solves) a lot of these cost risks, and we have already sourced tens of vendors, know their volume breaks, and have arranged payment and distribution terms that guarantee us two factors: a cost range on every part, and being able to manage the cost of lower volumes. In addition, our re-engineering and custom assembly process should cut down basic costs over time that competitors are unable to duplicate.
- **Lower sales than anticipated**
  While costs are a risk factor for every company, it is really sales that are the actual risk. Costs can be managed and mitigated, sales cannot. The sale is either there or not. The good thing about pinball (from a historical perspective) is that it has been quite non-correlated from macro-economic issues. In other words, recession-proof. And we know from historical records, that even when there were economic issues, or low overall market sales, the industry didn't dry up altogether. We think there are four main areas of why we think sales will be strong, and why variability in sales won't be unmanageable.
    1. We have specifically designed our development process and design around making sure a minimum number of sales makes that title profitable. In other words, we planned to make sure a minimal amount of sales makes every game sold, profitable. We've done this by analyzing the competition and determining how many limited editions (because they are the safest marketing bet in pinball) we need to offer on each game. After the sale of those limited editions, any additional game we sell would remain fully profitable over COGS.
    2. As a luxury item, many people who are buying pinball machines are wealthy and have excess disposable income to spend on an expensive toy. While the number of consumers may throttle from time to time, we plan to institute a payment plan (which is not offered by the other competitors) that would pay for itself (with the interest payments) to make sales more attractive on big-ticket items to middle-market consumers.
    3. Even in a worse case scenario where the company is at a wash or at a loss due to low or no sales, the strength continuity tends to make us predict that when economic conditions improve, sales would follow. Having a prolonged period of lower sales than breakeven would mean there are other more prevalent economic dangers and risks involved. In other words, the broader economy is also bad so all business will be dealing with the same issues.
    4. We have spent over 3 years re-engineering and re-innovating pinball. Almost 200 innovations. Many of them solve customer complaints from other manufacturers. Many provide easier ways to setup and maintain a machine. Many provide more exciting and convenient ways to play. We firmly believe that because we are including more value and more stuff in each machine for not much more $, that we will be able to command a profitable percentage of total NIB sales.
- **The economy tanks**
  See the above discussion on 'lower sales'.
- **Not enough money to pay back project**
  While we expect enough sales in the first few years to fully pay back project $ plus growth, the risk here is whether the amount of profit and timing on return of the profit will be timely for investor payments and maturities. The most likely risk-hypothetical would be that we would not

have any policy maturities for an extended period, along with an extended period of sub-par profits, at the same time as maturities come up in 2021-2022. We feel that between now and then we have many tools in our arsenal (other investments, building bigger reserves, etc.) to prepare for this (given future performance we do not yet know). Past 2022, it becomes more unclear and is contingent on a lot of guessing as to what might happen, to what extent, and how it impacts cash flow for investors. In the ideal scenario of this risk, profits will continue to drip to the Funds and we will adjust the budget elsewhere.

- **Company is sued for product failure or liability**
  The most likely legal risk we face is a lawsuit for product liability or an injury involved with our products. The good news is that we already have insurance at the industry standard $1MM per occurrence and $5MM aggregate that would cover those issues. If we feel we need a greater amount of insurance, we would simply upgrade our policy.
- **deeproot Funds is not able to pay payment or maturities**
  This is definitely what it comes down to. There are a few options at our disposal in a worst, worst case scenario like this, especially in the case of no renewals:
  - Use Reserves
  - Obtain financing from an affiliate to pay
  - Obtain external financing
  - Liquidate an investment
  - Liquidate unneeded assets
  - Negotiate with the investor for a renewal
  - Negotiate with the investor for a high-interest note
  - Pull from existing cash flows
  - A variant of the above
- **Robert dies**
  While Robert is important to deeproot, there is more than one key individual in each area that understands the vision and has the skillset to carry on. Like most companies, who are no longer run by the founder, there are ample people already on staff, and those that could potentially be hired, to follow-through if he were to become incapacitated or die.

MOVING FORWARD

After the Pinball project becomes self-sustaining, the need for additional investment opportunities becomes necessary. While we will still consider the 'normal list', right now, the obvious allocations of money for 2020 (apart from Pinball) are (in order of importance):

- Life Policies
- Reserves
- dSE Commitments
- A VR/AR hardware and software project
- A mobile game called Battle Grannies already in development at the Studios
- A simplified approach to Commercial Real Estate

To reiterate, the goal was to finish Pinball and then sink another round of capital in to life policies. However, we have made one major change to that plan. Instead of using our turn-key life policy brokers, we would like to bring policy sourcing in house. There are three main reasons. First, we do not know (and brokers don't tell) how much their cut is in every deal. We figure it could be quite sizable. It would benefit

everyone to cut out the middleman. Second, we are not convinced that the underwriting firms being used by our brokers (that review documents and attest to life expectancies) are reasonably accurate. Therefore we would like to get a second opinion on the life expectancy figures prior to buying. We are not able to do that with existing brokers who want to stifle that transparency. Third, by dealing directly with the insured (or their agent) we have a better opportunity negotiating the purchase price (and commission of the agent) into the final sales price. All of these would help us squeeze more return and better predictability about maturity.

The rest of the listed investment objectives would require further business planning, and of course, disclosure written up and included in the575 fund literature. We anticipate during this time we will be sharing great news about how we did (that very few companies in history have ever successfully done) with the Pinball project.

FINAL THOUGHTS

At the end of the day, we consider our mutual clients our top priority, and do consider your hard work, trust, and belief in us. We hope this narrative provides you with better clarification and comfort on our processes, deliberations, and decision making. We are confident you will continue to be able to see our vision succeed, and continue to earn your trust, in our path forward.

<end>